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AN ARTHURIAN TALE 
Aryeh Neier* 
RIGHTS ON TRIAL: THE ODYSSEY OF A PEOPLE'S LA WYER. By Ar-
thur Kinoy. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 1983. Pp. 
340. $20. 
As Arthur Kinoy sees it, he probably saved the United States from 
a fascist takeover with a brilliant argument to the United States 
Supreme Court. The immediate issue was whether the Court would 
uphold President Richard Nixon's claim that his office gave him inher-
ent power to conduct warrantless electronic eavesdropping in circum-
stances in which the President asserted that there was a threat to the 
domestic security of the United States. Far more was at stake, how-
ever, according to Kinoy: 
Once the cover of legality was established for the suspension of the con-
stitutional guarantees of individual liberty, the road was open, at the sole 
discretion of the President, to utilize the lists, carefully compiled by the 
FBI, of hundreds of thousands of citizens who were potential dangers to 
the establishment. Secret documents even then specified the concentra-
tion camps that could be used. No warrants would be required for 
wholesale roundups of these security dangers, and they could be held, by 
executive decree, without bail or trial. Fascism would have arrived, in 
Huey Long's words, "wrapped in an American flag." 
It is now absolutely clear that the Nixon Administration was seeking 
this legal cover for expet4nenting with the abandonment of constitu-
tional government .... [P. 31.] 
The Supreme Court's unanimous decision emphatically rejecting 
the claim of inherent power,_1 says Kinoy, "left the administration in 
total disarray" (p. 35). Moreover, the date of the decision had a signif-
icance not previously recognized - at least so far as this reviewer is 
aware. It was announced by the Supreme Court on June 19, 1972. 
Kinoy speculates that the break-in at the Watergate offices of the 
Democratic National Committee on June 17, 1972 took place when it 
did because someone at the Nixon White House received advance 
word of the adverse decision and went in to remove the bugs and mi-
crophones that had been installed there successfully three weeks ear-
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lier. In this scenario, the Nixon administration's plan had been to get 
the Supreme Court to legitimize electronic eavesdropping such as it 
had undertaken at the Watergate, but the plan had gone awry when 
the Court, moved by Kinoy's eloquence, had balked. Kinoy even goes 
so far as to speculate that "the never-explained eighteen-minute era-
sure of the confidential Nixon tapes of that Monday morning involved 
an explanation to the President of the real reasons for Saturday night's 
break-in, and its relation to Monday morning's Supreme Court deci-
sion," though he acknowledges that whether this was the case may 
"never be known" (p. 38). Such doubts aside, Kinoy asserts: 
[O]ne fact emerges sharp and clear beyond dispute. The conspiracy that 
was involved in the strange events of those June days was not a relatively 
simple conspiracy to "obstruct justice" or to "cover up" White House 
involvement or to buy an election through corruption and bribery. What 
was fundamentally involved was a conspiracy to move away from Amer-
ican constitutional government. It was a conspiracy which had at its 
heart the creation of a legal sanction for experimentation with a brand of 
fascism .... [P. 38.] 
As Arthur Kinoy looks back over his career, he finds that many of 
the legal struggles in which he engaged were comparably momentous. 
For example, if renowned liberal Judge Jerome Frank had had the 
courage of his convictions in 1953 when Kinoy and two colleagues 
went to the judge's home in New Haven to argue for a last minute stay 
of execution in the Rosenberg atomic bomb spying case, he "might, in 
a profound sense, have changed the course of American history" (p. 
125). And what embarrassed the United States Department of Justice 
under Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy into enforcing federal 
civil rights laws in the South was a lawsuit filed by Kinoy. "If the 
movement itself and the people's lawyers2 had not taken the offensive 
in the courts," according to Kinoy, "there never would have been any 
action . . . by the federal Justice Department" (p. 255). And so it has 
gone. 
Early in his book, in passing, Arthur Kinoy acknowledges his 
"predilection for exaggeration in the interest of driving home a point" 
(p. 29). Regrettably, he does not seem aware that this predilection 
also carries with it a cost. Exaggeration, in the case of this book, may 
obscure Kinoy's real achievements. Though these were perhaps not in 
a class with stopping the beast of fascism with one overpowering argu-
ment in the United States Supreme Court, Kinoy does deserve consid-
erable credit for helping to transform litigation into a tool of political 
struggle. He has been in the forefront of those who have recognized 
that a lawsuit is far more than an instrument for securing a particular 
judicially ordered result. It is also a means of expressing a point of 
2. The term "people's lawyers" is used throughout this book as a synonym for Kinoy and his 
associates. 
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view in a dramatic way; of turning the tables on powerful officials 
whose actions ordinarily go unquestioned; of organizing and giving a 
voice to those who may otherwise feel powerless; of forcing the disclo-
sure of information that one's antagonists in a struggle may not wish 
to reveal; of enlisting support for a cause from individuals and institu-
tions that respond favorably to certain legal arguments; and, as Kinoy 
points out repeatedly, going on the offensive and achieving even a mo-
mentary victory in court has a great impact on the morale of those 
struggling on behalf of the cause. 3 
As he relates in Rights on Trial, Kinoy embarked upon this ap-
proach to litigation at the outset of his career as a lawyer in the late 
1940's when he worked for the United.Electrical, Radio and Machine 
Workers of America (UE), a union whose officers had declined to sign 
affidavits, required under the Taft-Hartley Act, to the effect that they 
were not Communists. Failure to sign such affidavits deprived unions 
of their right to appear in ballots in National Labor Relations Board 
representation elections and denied them the right to be certified by 
the NLRB as a collective bargaining representative. Denial of these 
rights made the UE vulnerable to a· variety of attacks and, in the red-
baiting atmosphere of the times, it suffered a considerable onslaught 
from congressional investigating committees and from others. Kinoy 
helped to frame a counteroffensive that included suing members of 
Congress for violating first amendment rights. Though his lawsuit 
went nowhere, it helped to galvanize a spirit of resistance among be-
leaguered UE members. What he learned from this experience was 
reinforced a decade later in battles in which he participated on behalf 
of blacks in the South engaged in the civil rights struggles of the late 
1950's and of the 1960's, and helped to shape his approach, and the 
approach of a good many other lawyers, to "cause" litigation. 
Among the attractive features of Arthur Kinoy's autobiography is 
that the considerable zest that he has brought to the practice of cause 
litigation, and his own sense of excitement about struggle, are reflected 
in his writing. His writing is also highly readable. For this reviewer, 
however, a distracting feature is the book's subtitle, The Odyssey of a 
People's Lawyer, and the constant use of terms such as "people's law-
yers" and "people's movements." At one point, for example, he writes 
that, "the people's movement was putting it squarely to us as people's 
lawyers" (p. 250). Yet the only definition he supplies is that "the peo-
ple's lawyer represents movements of people who throughout the his-
tory of this country have struggled to protect and advance their 
elementary rights and interests against attempts by the government or 
big business to undermine or derail them" (p. 2). It is possible, it 
seems to me, to sympathize with many of the particular struggles to 
3. See, e.g., p. 201 ("[O]nce again I sensed the critical importance of even the most limited 
legal victories to the fighting morale of people in struggle."). 
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which Kinoy has devoted his talents and energies and, at the same 
time, to find it insufferably self-righteous for him to lay claim to being 
the "people's lawyer," as if the antagonists of his clients, or those who 
happen not to be involved in those struggles, were something other 
than "people." 
